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1.  Introduction 
Universal service obligations (USO) in the postal sector currently enjoy considerable attention 
among politicians, practitioners and academics. The primary areas of interest have been the viabil-
ity, costing and funding of the USO in a completely liberalized market. However, the purpose and 
the scope of the USO itself have so far not been questioned fundamentally. Indeed, the EC com-
mission has left the traditional definition unchanged in its most recent postal directive 2008/6/EC.  
Recent declines in overall mail volumes indicate fierce intermodal competition between postal 
and telecommunications networks (called “E-Substitution” from the postal point of view). In the 
US, overall mail volumes have declined by almost 17% between 2006 and 2009.1 Many operators 
predict volume declines by 30% and more in the years to come. High fixed costs and increasing 
price elasticities raise the question of how to finance the postal USO in the long-run.  
In line with this development, new substitutes might also be  a means to replace the traditional 
postal USO itself. Hence, a crucial long -term question will be whether increasing E -Substitution 
will inevitably lead to “U-Substitution” where states and governments prefer moving to a new 
form of USO encompassing the broader communication market, rather than subsidizing the tradi-
tional postal USO.   
This fundamental question is at the core of our paper: How can the postal USO be adapted to 
preserve its commercial viability while safeguarding its relevant characteristics for the economy?  
After a brief outline of today’s role of postal services in Section 2, we analyze in a first step the 
possible rationale for USO from an economic point of view. Based on our economic framework as 
presented in Jaag and Trinkner (2011b), sector-specific deviations from the perfect markets para-
digm motivate sector-specific regulations such as the USO. The framework allows us in Section 3 
to discuss various USO dimensions in light of potential market imperfections (asymmetric infor-
mation,  transaction  costs)  and,  more  importantly,  incomplete  markets  (positive  externalities, 
network effects). 
Given the two-sidedness of the postal market, the USO can be analyzed along three basic dimen-
sions, one being the sender, the second the recipient, and the third the connection between the 
two (the platform). Every dimension has specific key characteristics. Matching these dimensions 
and characteristics with the relevant deviations from the perfect markets paradigm, we derive the 
economic aims behind the USO (“rationale for the USO”) in Section 4.  
In a second step we analyze in Section 5 the impact of converging postal and telecommunications 
markets (the convergence expresses itself in new substitutes and e-substitution): Are there alterna-
tive means to fulfill the economic rationale behind the USO in a more efficient way? We identify 
aspects for which electronic and hybrid  means are true alternatives. In other words,  the new 
means are not able to fully replace postal services in their role to fulfill the USO. They will rather 
complement traditional means and thereby allow for targeted adaptations of the USO. Section 5.3 
presents then generic principles to guide the design of such adaptations and provides an outline 
of a future-oriented USO. Section 6 concludes. 
   
                                                            
1  USPS and Cahiers de l’ARCEP, Septembre-Octobre 2010, p. 55. S. 2/17   
2.  Postal services today 
Today’s role of universal postal services can be understood along the following dimensions. First, 
universal postal services can be seen as “enablers” to other parts of the economy by linking buy-
ers and sellers. Second, in line with the progress of digital means for written communications and 
financial  transactions,  posts can be seen as transformers between the physical and  the digital 
world. Third, politicians often attribute a social role to postal services. Last, universal service obli-
gations and their financing raise competitive issues in fully or partly liberalized markets. 
Traditional role: The post as “enabler” 
Postal services are a means for senders to overcome distances to recipients. As illustrated in Fig-
ure  1,  postal  services  act  as  intermediaries  that  consolidate  mail  of  different  senders,  thereby 
reducing transaction costs through the exploitation of economies of scale, density, and scope.2 As 
a result, transaction costs for the  delivery of letters and parcels are reduced greatly compared to 
self-delivery by individuals.  
Figure 1: Post as intermediaries that minimize transaction cost 
 
In the limit, with a high number of senders and receivers, a postal system has a low number of 
connections compared to self delivery: 
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As a consequence, postal services are an integral part of the daily commercial activities. Following 
Dietl and Trinkner (2009), these can be characterized along the following basic processes: (1) mak-
ing potential customers aware of an offer, (2) agreeing on a bargain, (3) delivering the promised 
deliverables, (4) billing, and (5) payment by the customer. For standing orders, (6) customers need 
an enforceable way to quit subscriptions. The sequence of these steps is largely determined by the 
payment mechanism in place. Historically, universal services have played (and are still playing) a 
vital role in all six process steps:  
(1) Advertising: Letters (direct mail) are an important means to advertise new products in a speci-
fied area or for selected customers satisfying certain criteria (“targeting”). In contrast to other 
media, direct mail remains the only means to physically reach any customer, no matter where the 
customer may live, its internet usage patterns, or whether a TV is available, switched on at the 
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right time on the right channel. In Switzerland, the postal channel historically was very popular 
for sending product samples, e.g. testers of a new candy. 
(2) Closing a deal: An important fraction of (bargain) contracts are signed at home and sent to the 
contracting party by mail. Whether or not one closes a distance sale depends largely on the avail-
ability, reliability, quality and price of postal services (letters, parcels) and their support for the 
enforceability of a contract. Thereby, the ubiquity of universal services increases the market as 
businesses can reach a larger number of potential customers. 
(3) Delivering: Long distance sales require a convenient, modestly priced and reliable parcels ser-
vice to deliver the goods to the buyer. Senders must be reasonably sure that the goods have been 
delivered to the recipient/client. 
(4) Billing: For subscriptions, but as well for distance and online selling, a cheap standard mail 
service will be required to send invoices and dunning letters. For outstanding invoices, additional 
added value services will be of importance, e.g. registered mail or writs. Thereby, a higher quality 
of the service will increase the credibility of these means. 
(5) Payment: Besides the need for a reliable threat of sellers to enforce outstanding invoices (see 
4.), a convenient low-cost payment means should be available. Here, post offices often play an 
important role: Taking Switzerland as an example, anybody can pay any bill with cash without 
any surcharge.  
(6) Cancellation: To cancel a subscription, the contracting party often requires a notice in writing. 
Again, letters must be available and accessible. 
Table 1: Business processes and corresponding postal products  
Generic Business Process   Role of Postal Services  
(1) Advertisement   Addressed and unaddressed mail  
(2) Closing a deal   Letters, registered mail  
(3) Delivering   Parcels, periodicals & newspapers, letters  
(4) Billing   Invoices, reminders, registered mail, writs  
(5) Payment   Checks, postal counters, postal payment systems 
(6) Cancellation (of subscriptions)  Letters, registered mail  
Source: Dietl and Trinkner (2009) 
Table 1 provides a summary of the role of postal services and shows how postal services are an 
integral part of the daily commercial activities. Thereby, universal postal services reduce transac-
tion costs between buyers and sellers in various aspects. They also play an important role in 
enforcing contracts and property rights (cf. Section 3 for an economic treatment). For the latter, it 
is of importance to recognize the role of the postal system as an integrating part of a national legal 
system to enforce contracts. Without reliable standard mail services (to send invoices, reminders), 
registered mail and writs (possibility to have a proof of having informed the counter party), and 
cheap  payment  means  for  anybody  (including  people  without  a  bank  account),  many  trades 
would not take place. 
This interplay between letters, parcels, and financial transactions is reflected in national universal 
service obligations that often include all three product categories. The importance of this interplay 
is reflected in a global scale as well: The Universal Postal Union (UPU), established in 1874 as one 
of the oldest international organizations, aims to ensure interconnection and termination of inter-
national letters, parcels, and financial payments.  
If postal services enable economic activity, can economic activity be measured by postal volumes? 
Does economic activity (e.g. taking the GDP as proxy) influence postal volumes or is it the other S. 4/17   
way round? If the arguments above hold true, there will be a connection in both ways: Good 
postal services will foster economic activity, and higher economic activity will result in higher 
postal  volumes.  It  is  not  surprising  that  most  empirical studies  on  this  matter  have  shown  a 
strong, often close to 1:1 relationship between GDP and overall letter volumes. That is, 1% more 
economic GDP would increase postal volumes by about 1%, ceteris paribus. Trinkner and Gross-
man (2006) show that despite e-substitution, the relationship still holds true in Switzerland.3 
More recent role: The post as “transformer of last resort”? 
With regards to e-substitution it is crucial whether postal services will keep their (economic) im-
portance in a digital age. There is an extensive literature on e-substitution and the future of mail.4 
The results indicate clearly that traditional postal services are increasingly substituted. These 
substitutes are preferred by customers because they offer similar service features. Consequently, 
postal operators are forced to offer competitive access to their (traditional) channels. Postal opera-
tors have three options – and most modern administrations follow the three paths simultaneously.  
Firstly, posts use new digital technologies to add value to their traditional products. Examples 
include track and trace services and intelligent mail. Secondly, posts have introduced electronic 
substitutes themselves, e.g. electronic registered mail, electronic P.O. boxes, electronic delivery, or 
e-banking, mobile and EBPP for payment services. Thirdly, posts increasingly act as “transfor-
mers” between physical and digital media. Examples include E-commerce, hybrid mail, document 
services, electronic stamp, response management, mailroom services, scanning, in-payments, out-
payments, integrated e-shops including physical delivery and payment, and other. By offering 
these interfaces, posts implicitly support the digital world by serving as a “transformer of last 
resort”, similarly as national banks do in their role as “lender of last resort”. Consumers can, if 
they want, go back into the physical again (Dietl and Trinkner, 2009).  
In this light, posts can be seen as a “physical insurance” for digital means by providing a physical 
backup. 
The social role 
A third role often raised in political discussions is the impact of universal services to rural regions, 
labor conditions, social cohesion, and accessibility to citizens for voting and taxing. 
The competitive role 
A last aspect has emerged in partly or fully liberalized markets. Universal service obligations and 
their financing have fundamental effects that are important for all operators engaged in the postal 
market.  First, pricing constraints implied by the USO move prices away from the competitive 
equilibrium which may lead to a deadweight loss (Cremer et al., 2001). Second, it may determine 
the business model of the largest player in the market and thereby change the market structure 
(cf. Dietl et al., 2011b and Jaag, 2011). Third, it requires a financing mechanism to compensate for 
the net cost of the USO, which may lead to over- or under-funding of the Universal Service Pro-
vider (USP) and change the profitability of competitors (cf. Jaag and Trinkner, 2011a). Hence, the 
USO is as much a competitive policy as it is a social policy. 
                                                            
3  Note that the effect of e-substitution overlays other effects such as economic activity. Hence, postal volumes can well 
differ from GDP or other measures for economic activity. See Trinkner and Grossmann (2006) for an illustration. 
4  See Nikali (2011) for a recent contribution.    S. 5/17 
3.  Economic foundations of the postal USO 
In order to understand the underlying need for universal services and develop recommendations 
for its adaptation in an electronic age, this section presents an economic foundation to the USO. 
There are different ways to motivate the postal USO using economic theory.5 In this section we 
apply the economic framework as presented in Trinkner (2009a) and Jaag and Trinkner (2011b) to 
the postal sector. Thereby, we summarize the main contributions in the field and elaborate on the 
relevant economic concepts to explain the USO. 
3.1  Perfect markets: Redistribution 
In perfectly competitive markets, the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal (first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics). Hence, there is a priori no need for regulating uni-
versal services.  
The second theorem of welfare economics establishes that by use of appropriate lump sum trans-
fers,  one  can  achieve  different  Pareto  efficient  market  equilibria  with  different  wealth 
distributions. This second theorem gives rise to a first fundamental source of market interven-
tions:  redistribution.  For  example,  if  a  society  agreed  on  a  social  goal  like  an  even  income 
distribution, it could do so by appropriately defining lump sum transfers. Lump sum transfers are 
hard to establish in practice due to asymmetric information and transaction costs. Following Cre-
mer et al. (2001, 2008) uniform pricing obligations can be seen as a 2nd best redistributive pricing 
policy to contribute to the targeted wealth distribution. Uniform pricing has at least two redistri-
butive effects, from business customers (low cost, high bargaining power) to private customers 
(high cost, low bargaining power) and from densely populated regions to remote regions with 
high-cost delivery. Crew and Kleindorfer (2002, p. 12) argue that the deregulation’s likely primary 
driver is based on such redistribution grounds.  
3.2  Market imperfections 
Sector-specific deviations from the perfect market paradigm are a second source to explain the 
postal USO. Recall that the perfect market assumption lies at the basis of the two welfare theo-
rems. Important assumptions are: 
Assumption 1: Any company or consumer in the economy acts as price taker, i.e. there is no 
bargaining or market power;  
Assumption 2: Markets are complete, i.e. there exists a price for every good – there are no exter-
nalities (or they are readily traded and thus internalized correctly);6  
Assumption 3: Information is symmetrically distributed (no asymmetric information) and there 
are no transaction costs.  
These assumptions are very rigid and they are hardly ever met in practice. This gives room for 
market failures. Market failures are “situations in which some of the assumptions of the welfare 
theorems do not hold and in which, as a consequence, market equilibria cannot be relied on to 
yield Pareto optimal outcomes” (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 350). As a consequence, general and 
sector-specific regulation tackling the relevant market imperfections can potentially result in effi-
ciency gains. 
                                                            
5  An overview over normative and positive concepts is provided in Cremer et al. (2001).  
6  For the link between incomplete markets and externalities see Arrow (1969). S. 6/17   
3.2.1  General market imperfections across sectors 
Many deviations from perfect markets can be observed in most if not all markets. Generally, it 
makes sense to tackle them uniformly and equally among all sectors of an economy. First of all, 
and in light of important information asymmetries, any society must find ways to allocate and 
enforce property rights, and to secure commercial freedom and free adjustment of prices. Conse-
quently, an important share of civil and commercial law deals with securing property rights and 
making contracts better enforceable in a world of incomplete contracts and asymmetric informa-
tion. Further important sources of general regulations are competition or antitrust laws aiming to 
limit harmful abuse of market power. 
With respect to postal services, relevant general law includes the legal status and means of written 
(handwritten and electronic) signatures to enforce property rights. Historically, handwritten sig-
natures have been complemented with registered mail services which are often part of the legal 
framework.7 In that they become official means to enforce contracts, thereby improving market 
efficiency. Following the idea of Dietl and Trinkner (2009), this role requires the combinatio n of 
two features being offered in the market place: (1) legally binding proof of receipt for written cor-
respondence, e.g. registered mail services, and (2) a network that can reach everybody based on 
her name (and physical and/or electronic address). Where the market does not provide such ser-
vices, corresponding sector-specific USO regulations in postal and/or telecommunications acts 
might be appropriate to improve overall market efficiency.  
3.2.2  Sector-specific market imperfections 
Sector-specific deviations from the perfect markets assumptions 2 and 3 provide important moti-
vations for the postal USO.  
3.2.2.1  Externalities 
External effects are present when one economic agent’s action affects the actions of other agents in 
the economy. External effects can be positive or negative and are closely linked to incomplete 
markets; when an economic agent’s own action has a positive effect on others but is not rewarded 
in return, there exists no market for  this external  effect.  In general, when external effects are 
present, market equilibria are not efficient, as these effects are not taken into account in individual 
decisions and induce an “externality” (positive or negative). However, potentially, they can be 
“internalized”, e.g. by public obligations, taxes, quotas or the allocation of property rights (where 
these are in fact enforceable without causing excessive transaction costs, see Coase, 1960, Mas-
Colell, 1995). 
There are three approaches to motivate the postal USO based on externalities; each of these is 
described in detail below. 
Classical view 
The utility of a user increases with the number of users connected to the network. For example, a 
phone subscription is much more valuable if others are connected to the network too (among 
others, cf. Willig (1979). Hence, one agent’s decision to subscribe or not affects the utility of others. 
In this view, a USO can be seen as a policy to correct market inefficiencies caused by (network) 
externalities. Similarly, letters as a media might be much more attractive if everyone can reach 
                                                            
7  Code of obligations, tenancy laws and many other acts often include registered mail services. Thereby, it is assumed that 
such services are available (or regulated elsewhere in detail).     S. 7/17 
anyone. While the argument is not contested in telecommunications where recipients must pay a 
price to be connected to the telecommunications network (see e.g. Riordan, 2001), the situation is 
different in the postal markets. Cremer et al. (2008) claim that this view is “probably of limited 
relevance for the postal sector”, as it relies “on a symmetric view of externalities where all sub-
scribers are potential callers and receivers” (p. 27).8 The crucial question in the classical view is 
whether postal operators are able to internalize network externalities through differentiated pric-
ing in a completely deregulated market. Independently of the symmetry-argument by Cremer et 
al. (2008), one can argue that there are network externalities that cannot be internalized by price 
differentiation of postal operators in a completely deregulated market if there are (1) capacity 
costs  or  fixed  costs  that  require  two-part  tariffs  for  first-best  pricing  combined  with  (2)  non-
excludability of consumption with regards to the fixed part of the two-part tariff. Because of po-
tential free riding, this is indeed the case in the postal market: For a sender it will not be optimal 
to pay the postal service the fixed fee. Instead, it will be optimal to share the fee with a neighbor 
or use consolidators. Operators may react by suboptimal coverage (too low) and/or suboptimal 
pricing  (too high), leading to a  failure to internalize the network externalities optimally. This 
would raise the need for a nationwide USO in coverage and affordability. 
Two-sided market view 
Closely linked to (or a more modern view of) network externalities are externalities between dif-
ferent market sides of a platform. Where lump sum price redistributions between market sides 
affect overall demand, markets are said to be two- or multi-sided (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). These 
pricing implications are crucial, and often one market side remains heavily subsidized. Many 
network industries, such as telecommunications, cable networks and postal markets can be un-
derstood as being such platforms. The larger the one side of the platform, the greater the utility on 
the other side of the platform. Such cross-side effects inhibit externalities that might call for USO 
regulations. 
There is no doubt that postal markets are two-sided (e.g. Panzar, 2006, Cremer et al., 2008, Jaag 
and Trinkner, 2008). Postal operators are platforms (intermediaries) that link senders and reci-
pients, as well as sellers/businesses and buyers/clients. The larger the recipient base, the greater 
are the business opportunities on the sender side and the more attractive are letters as a me-
dium/platform. Conversely, recipients may be more likely to empty their  mailbox if they can 
expect many letters from a large sender base. 
Jaag and Trinkner (2008) discuss the implication of the two-sidedness of the postal market on 
pricing and show the importance to subsidize the recipient side of the market. Their results sup-
port  the  “sender  pays  principle”  of  today’s  postal  markets  including  free  home  delivery  as 
ensured by today’s USO. 
Cremer et al. (2008) show in their two-sided market model that a profit maximizing postal opera-
tor will chose a suboptimal low quality in delivery (coverage or reduced frequency of service) 
leading to a decrease in demand.9 The authors conclude that “this problem might be solved, or at 
least mitigated, through a USO” (p. 28) and thereby provide a basis for quality and coverage con-
straints. 
                                                            
8  In the telecommunications market, a large part of the consumers sends (calls) about as much as it receives whereas in the 
postal market, net flows are strongly imbalanced. A small group of large mailers accounts for a large part of the items 
sent. Correspondingly, a high fraction of recipients receives much more postal items than it sends. 
9  The model assumes that senders’ surplus depends on the number of households that can be reached at a certain level of 
service. When a call externality is introduced into the model (increasing utility of addressee in number of mail items re-
ceived), the results are reinforced. S. 8/17   
The definition of two-sided markets may also provide support for uniform pricing, as illustrated 
by the following example. Postage is usually charged to the senders. However, the charges are 
often passed on to the recipients, e.g. by banks or distance mail order companies. If these pass on 
single piece prices instead of wholesale prices collected by the postal operators (which is very 
often the case), the price signals in the market (single-piece price) are higher than the effective 
(wholesale) prices charged by the platform. Under uniform pricing, there is no difference and 
hence overall demand will be higher. 
Public/merit good 
A third view introduced by Gori et al. (2002) is that the postal network can be characterized as 
public good, independently of the services offered to the consumers (e.g. social cohesion, func-
tioning of democracy, ethical issues). Cremer et al. (2001, 2008) argue that such a network can be 
understood as producing “externalities that are non-trivial in nature”. Hence the USO (especially 
accessibility requirements for traditional post offices) would be a mechanism for the provision of 
the public good (even if the mere postal services were private goods). Hence, public goods might 
offer a second line of argumentation to justify social issues, or alternatively, be used to support 
redistributive pricing polices (cf. Section 3.1).  
3.2.2.2  Information asymmetries  
An important issue related to asymmetric information is the hidden characteristics of postal ser-
vices. Traditionally, quality of service has been hidden information (the sender cannot observe the 
quality of service as the service is fulfilled on the recipient side). In turn, adverse selection cannot 
be excluded which may lead to suboptimal quality in the market. In this light, the USO with cor-
responding regulatory authorities might be seen as a measure to ensure a standard quality in the 
market with the least cost of monitoring.10 Note however that in some market segments, track and 
trace solutions are becoming the standard means for delivery, allowing senders to observe the 
delivery status of their items. This resolves the issue of asymmetric information. 
3.2.2.3  Transaction costs 
The transaction cost argument as presented in Section 2 is likely to be resolved by the market (by 
postal operators) wherever the consumers’ reductions in transaction cost exceed the cost of service 
provision. Crew and Kleindorfer (1998) argue that uniform pricing regulations might yield reduc-
tions  in  transaction  costs  that  are  otherwise  not  achieved  by  the  market.  Uniform  prices  can 
reduce uncertainty for senders and allow higher efficiency in mail collection and processing. If the 
reduction in transaction costs is higher than the welfare losses eventually caused by uniform pric-
ing,11 uniform pricing is optimal and should be included in the USO for those market segments 
where a deregulated market is expected to lead to (or enforce) price differentiation (e.g. because of 
entry in low-cost delivery areas). 
4.  Economic rationale of the postal USO 
As a consequence of the two-sidedness of the postal market, the USO can be analyzed along the 
three dimensions that are illustrated in Figure 2.  
                                                            
10   Asymmetric information is present in many industries. Regulation is required where the industry fails to develop credi-
ble solutions (e.g. quality certificates).  
11 In perfectly competitive markets, uniform pricing constraints always decrease welfare. However, as we have seen above, 
this is not necessarily the case in the postal market as there are important deviations from perfect markets, e.g. external i-
ties.      S. 9/17 
Relevant sender-specific features include the opportunity cost for sender S to reach postal services at 
the point of collection C (e.g. post office, agency, online), the availability of services and opening 
hours in C, and availability of online solutions and ability of S to use them. In analogy, the reci-
pient-specific features are the opportunity cost of recipient R to reach postal services at the point of 
delivery D (e.g. mail box, post office, P.O. box, electronic inbox), the availability of services and 
time of delivery at D, and the availability of online solutions and ability of R to use them. The 
third dimension is characterized by the services provided by the platform to link the sender and 
recipient sides (C – D). Of relevance are the basic products offered (e.g. letters, parcels) including 
their specific features (e.g. end-to-end speed, reliability, price, value added services).   
Figure 2: USO elements in the two-sided market approach 
 
 
The USO candidates as developed in Section 3 can be assigned to these three dimensions as illu-
strated in Figure 2. Ubiquity and accessibility are of concern for the sender and recipient side. 
Important characteristics of the platform (the service between the sides) include the scope of ser-
vices (e.g. letters, parcels, registered items), reliability, quality, uniformity, and affordability.  
In this context, an “economic rationale of the USO” that precludes any potential market failure as 
discussed in Section 3 would read as follows: 
“Ensuring  standard  services  (“uniform”)  for  the  delivery  of  written  communication  and  goods 
(“scope”) that enable everybody in the economy to reach everybody else (anybody connected as sender 
and recipient, “ubiquity”) under reasonable accessibility (no large effort to use the service as sender or 
recipient, “accessibility”) within a reasonable timeframe (for example next day, “quality”) on a reliable 
basis (one must know that the recipient indeed receives the items sent, “reliability”) at affordable rates 
(the cost should not exclude from consumption, “affordability”).” 
This rational is a priori not far away from legist 
A crucial question is whether the potential market failures discussed above are likely to be present 
in the postal sector in the future. In particular, some of the economic needs might already be ful-
filled sufficiently by electronic alternatives. Wherever the market is likely to satisfy the needs 
satisfied by the USO, sector-specific regulation should fade out or turn inoperative. Given the 
“digital revolution”, changes of the need to regulate postal universal services are likely. In the 
remainder, we investigate the impact of electronic alternatives and derive an outline of a future-
oriented USO.12 
                                                            
12   To derive the actual needs of the customers, a comprehensive market survey would be necessary. Currently, the EC has 
commissioned a study Rand Europe, Accent and Swiss Economics to better measure consumer preferences in the postal 
market. The study will be published by the end of the year. 
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5.  Defining the USO in an electronic age 
5.1  Convergence of postal and telecommunications markets 
The digitalization trend of the past decades has resulted in a number of new technologies allow-
ing  letters  to  be  increasingly  replaced  and  substituted.  Written  communication  takes  place  in 
digital media while letters have seen their peak in most industrialized countries.13 Indeed, one can 
argue that the postal market and the telecommunications market are conve rging and that e -
substitution is a reflection of letter mail’s loss in market share in the communications market. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the structural change of the postal industry due to the convergence of transaction-
based markets.  
Figure 3: Evolution and convergence of (transaction) markets 
 
Source: Dietl et al. (2011a) 
Figure 4: Sector-specific Regulation in Converging Markets 
 
Source: Based on Maegli et al. (2010) 
                                                            
13   See Trinkner (2009) for the historic development of mail volumes in Switzerland since 1900. 
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Maegli et al. (2010) propose a “unified approach” to regulate universal services in posts and tele-
communications. Such an approach would consist of a jointly defined universal service obligation 
and corresponding regulation, together with a separated, sector-specific regulatory regime for 
monopolistic bottleneck resources and interconnection issues. This framework would be consis-
tent  with  the  layer-oriented  framework  often  applied  in  the  telecommunications  market 
(“disaggregate approach”, see Knieps, 2002). Figure 4 is inspired by these approaches.  
5.2  New means communications: Substitutes and complements 
In such a “layers-oriented unified approach” – and in line with the economic “rationale of the 
USO” as developed in Section 4 – the combined postal and telecommunications USO would be 
defined in a rather generic and flexible way. Thereby, changing market conditions and the impact 
of new substitutes are implicitly accounted for.  
Recalling the analysis of externalities in Section 3.2.2, new digital means resulting in platform 
competition between physical and digital means are likely to change the economic need for inter-
nalizing externalities by USO policies. For example, registered mail might diminish in value to the 
society when digital alternatives like digital signatures (a) have been implemented in the legal 
framework and (b) have succeeded in the market. While some USO elements may be of decreas-
ing  value, others may become more valuable  to society. Examples are the delivery of  parcels 
because of online shopping or the role of postal services as “transformers of last resort” (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2). Similarly, new combinations of physical postal services with new digital means will 
allow for selected adjustments of the postal USO. Potential candidates are, among others, elec-
tronic collection of letters (that are later printed out and delivered physically) or electronic/hybrid 
delivery  of  letters  (scanning,  instantaneous  electronic  delivery,  weekly  physical  delivery  of 
scanned mail).  
Figure 5 illustrates the platform competition in the delivery of communications (substitutes) as 
well as new digital means that can improve traditional postal services (complements, dotted ar-
rows).  
Figure 5: Substitutes and complements in the delivery of communication and goods 
 
Table 2 presents an indicative, non-exhaustive list of the new digital means (column 4) and com-
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Table 2: New means to provide universal services 
Economic Rationale  New physical means   New digital complements  New digital substitutes 
Sender 
Ubiquity  –   “Territorial neutrality”  “Territorial neutrality” 
Accessibility   Modern customized collec-
tion points, 3rd party 
collection, pick-up  
Online solutions, mobile 
solutions 
Online solutions, mobile 
solutions 
Recipient 
Ubiquity  –   Recipients without physical 
address, virtual recipients 
Recipients independent of 
physical address, virtual 
recipients, multiple addresses 
Accessibility   Centralized mail boxes, cus-
tomized and variable delivery 
locations14 
Digital inboxes15, tracking 
services 
Online solutions, mobile 
solutions 
Connection 
Scope  –  Added value services, elec-
tronic services 
Limited to communication in 
general 
Quality   Improvement in Quality of 
Service 
Electronic pre-delivery16  Instantaneous delivery 
Reliability  Guaranteed delivery  Tracking services for letters17, 
digital signatures from reci-
pients, personal permanent 
address18 
Digital identities, digital 
signatures, fully encrypted 
communication, 100% relia-
bility 
Affordability  Competitors  Depending on avoided cost in 
physical delivery 
Low to zero cost 
 
The 3rd column of Table 2 indicates that digital substitutes for postal services are limited to com-
munication.  Regardless  of  the  digital  revolution,  delivery  of  physical  goods  will  remain 
important. The second column shows that there are important digital complements to traditional 
postal services that can be used to fulfill the economic rationale of the USO. As a consequence, it is 
likely that the current definition of the USO will have to face a change in the near future.  
5.3  Adapting the postal USO to an electronic age 
5.3.1  Generic principles to amendments of the USO 
Given our economic foundation of the postal USO, any realignment of the USO should be based 
on the following five principles:  
–  Output-orientation: Viewing postal operators as companies transforming inputs (labor, capi-
tal/infrastructures, energy) into outputs (mail items collected and delivered), obligations 
should tie to outputs rather than inputs. An example of an input-regulation would be a 
minimum number of traditional post offices or frequency of delivery. Instead, regulations 
should be output-oriented and describe accessibility of services or speed of service (e.g. 
next day excluding Sunday).  
                                                            
14   E.g. Pick-Post, a means by Swiss Post where recipients can flexibly chose their delivery location. 
15   E.g. eBoks, NetPosti.  
16   E.g. Swiss Post Box. 
17   E.g. „A-Post Plus“ from Swiss Post. 
18   Generic, unique address that follows recipient worldwide and throughout its life.    S. 13/17 
–  Technological neutrality: Output-regulations should be defined independently of the tech-
nology  applied.  Regulations  should  not  be  linked  to  a  particular  technology.  Rather, 
output-regulations should be aligned to the consumers’ needs.   
–  Product neutrality: The output-regulations should be formulated in a rather generic way in 
order to allow the universal service provider  to amend its product portfolio over time. 
Hence, product-specific obligations (e.g. “first class mail”) should be avoided.  
–  Necessity: Universal services are to be defined as a basic service addressing the most basic 
needs of the consumers. On top of these basic services, universal service providers (or their 
competitors) will be able to provide value added services on a purely commercial basis.  
–  Viability: The obligations should be defined in a viable way in order to avoid an excessive 
external financial need to compensate for the cost of the USO.  
For illustrative purposes, we outline a technology-neutral USO in delivery in the following sec-
tion. 
5.3.2  Example: Delivery 
Traditional USO in the postal sector often include an obligation to deliver countrywide on at least 
five days per week.19 There have been various attempts at reducing the cost associated with this 
obligation. Examples include delivery to centralized Post Office boxes in remote regions instead of 
doorstep delivery, reduced delivery frequency in remote areas, outsourcing of rural deliveries to 
partner firms with more flexible labor cost, or differentiated pricing (zonal pric ing) to reflect dif-
ferences in delivery cost across regions. 
The most important hindrance for the introduction of such relaxations to the USO is lacking co n-
sumer consent. However, from a technology point of view, in many places, giving away free e -
readers such as Kindle or iPad would cost considerably less than printing and delivering postal 
items. Hence, the USO could be adjusted such that convenient alternative forms of delivery means 
may be chosen as alternatives to physical delivery. A recipient might not insist on a daily physical 
delivery if in turn it gets an e -reader and guaranteed electronic delivery of all letter mail items 
while still being guaranteed that all requested items are delivered physically some time (e.g. every 
other day, once a week). 
An example for such an electronic delivery service complementing and potentially substituting 
physical delivery is the “Swiss Post Box” service. Whenever Swiss Post collects and sorts a letter 
addressed to the receiving customer, the envelope is scanned and emailed to the customer’s cell 
phone. The customer then has the options to have the letter opened and scanned, recycled, arc-
hived  or  delivered  to  the  physical  address.  Hence,  not  all  letter  mail  needs  to  be  delivered 
physically and daily. 
The commercial viability of such a service depends on a technologically neutral formulation of the 
USO.20 This means that the focus is on the satisfaction of consumer needs, not on the technology 
used to achieve it. For example, if the main needs of recipients concerning  postal services are 
physical and timely delivery, the technology used by the operator is of little interest. Being a s e-
cure electronic complement to the physical mailbox, “reverse hybrid mail services” such as Swiss 
Post Box improve physical delivery and save postal operators’ costs at the same time.  
                                                            
19   See EC Postal Directive 2008/6/EC. 
20   See Dietl et al. (2010). S. 14/17   
5.3.3  Outline of a future-oriented postal USO 
In light of the above considerations, a future-oriented USO can be outlined as follows. It is sum-
marized in Table 3.  
The universal service provider (the platform) is required to offer at least one letter and parcel ser-
vice (“basic services”) that ensures compliance with a set of obligations that are related to speed, 
reliability, affordability and uniformity (“basic requirements”). Those products that are necessary 
to achieve compliance with the USO requirements are then implicitly the regulated ones. Products 
that differ in at least one dimension are not regulated. For example, a product with non-uniform 
pricing or very slow delivery time would not be regulated.  
On the sender side, the regulation of collection is limited to the nationwide availability (ubiquity) 
and accessibility of the basic services. Thereby, no particular form of collection is presumed (e.g. 
post offices) to enable customer-friendly adaptations of the postal network over time including 
online solutions where this is feasible.  
On the recipient side, the standard mode of delivery remains home delivery for all letters and 
parcels (i.e. it is not limited to basic services as opposed to the sender side). Whether the asso-
ciated cost for the USP is appropriate and deviations from home delivery are allowed depends on 
the electronic alternatives provided. Daily delivery is not required explicitly. It may be required 
implicitly however where it is necessary or optimal to meet the requirements that the postal plat-
form must satisfy for the “basic services”. For example, daily delivery would be necessary where 
these requirements include demanding speed requirements such as J+1, while J+3 may make it 
optimal to deliver every second or third day only.  
Table 3: Outline of a future-oriented postal USO 
Economic Rationale  Traditional postal USO (EC stylized)  Outline of a future-oriented postal USO 
Sender 
Ubiquity  Every citizen  Every citizen  
Accessibility   Letter drop and post office nearby, collection 
at least 5 days per week 
Customer-oriented collection facilities, access-
ible at least every working day 
Recipient 
Ubiquity  Delivery  to  almost  every  citizen.  Delivery  at 
least days per week.  
Delivery  of  basic  services  to  almost  every 
citizen. 
Accessibility   Mail box or P.O. box for x% of population  Physical  and/or  electronic  mail  box. Physical 
mode  to  home  premises  as  standard  mode, 
but  with  increased  flexibility  if  electronic 
alternatives are available. 
Connection 
Scope  Letters, parcels, registered mail  Basic service for letters and parcels, option for 
proof of reception.  
Quality   Speed: E+1 to E+3  
Fulfillment: X% of items. 
Standard  speed  requirement  (E+x)  for  basic 
services where Sundays and/or Saturdays are 
not  counted  in  the  measurement,  less  de-
manding speed requirement where combined 
with instantaneous electronic delivery 
Reliability  Postal secrecy  Postal  secrecy,  integrity  requirements  for 
electronic services  
Affordability  Prices must be affordable  Limited to basic services  
Uniformity  Prices might be uniform for single peace items  Limited to basic services  
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In such a framework, the first role of regulators will be to approve changes in the accessibility of 
collection and delivery subject to a set of clearly defined criteria. The second role will be to control 
whether there are products offered by the incumbent that lead to compliance with the rather ge-
neric basic requirements as described above. Correspondingly, postal service providers will be 
flexible enough to adapt their product range over time to the changing needs of consumers as 
long as the basic requirements are still met.   
6.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have discussed how the postal USO can be adapted to preserve its commercial 
viability while safeguarding its relevant characteristics for the economy.  
The primary role of postal services in the economy is the reduction of transaction costs while sup-
porting the enforcement of property rights. The regulation of universal postal services can be 
motivated by redistributive aims or, alternatively, as a policy to mitigate market failures, notably 
in the context of network externalities in the two-sided postal market. Based on these potential 
market failures we have derived an economic rationale of the USO that can be summarized as 
ensuring ubiquity and accessibility for senders and recipients for a postal platform that provides a 
set of basic services which are of quality, reliable, affordable and uniform.  
We have left opened the question whether USO regulations are (still) necessary from an economic 
perspective  unanswered.  Instead  we  have  asked  whether  the  postal  USO  can  be  adapted  to 
strengthen its commercial viability in an electronic age while safeguarding the relevant characte-
ristics of postal services for the economy. Doing so, we have summarized electronic complements 
and substitutes to traditional postal services and have indicated how old and new means can be 
combined to better provide their economic rationale in the market place.  
Based on this analysis we have outlined a future-oriented definition of the USO that follows five 
generic principles: output-orientation, technological neutrality, product neutrality, necessity, and 
viability. Following these principles, there will be a need to adapt the USO in most countries. To 
this end, a crucial source of information will be country-specific, accurate data on customers’ pre-
ferences for the delivery of goods and communications. Ultimately, the generic principles may 
end in a “unified approach” where universal services are defined jointly for the postal and the 
telecommunications sector. 
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